far from being a principle of its own, has to be interpreted within the dynamics of Plotinus's philosophical thinking as a unique, though numerously applicable flaw-pattern for all the single kakã (hence the Platonic aÈtÒ). To conclude, I shall offer a short outlook on the consistency of this interpretation with Plotinus's teaching on the soul and with the further Neoplatonic development of the doctrine of evil.
H.: Do you see yonder cloud that's almost in shape of a camel? P.: By th' mass and 'tis -like a camel indeed. H.: Methinks it is like a weasel. P.: It is backed like a weasel. H.: Or like a whale. P.: Very like a whale.
Hamlet III 2
It is the scope of this paper to reassess, and to answer, if possible, one scandalous and much fought over question of Plotinus studies: is matter in the Enneads to be identified with 'evil'? I shall come back to Plotinus's concept (if not 'definition') of matter shortly. For starters, it is above all the meaning of 'evil' that must be determined: for there is no modern European language equivalent, to my knowledge, of the Greek word kakÒn. Whatever is conceived of as bad, evil, wicked, base, vile, calamitous, foul, or negative in any way, can be expressed by this word, as the dictionaries show. Whenever I employ in the following the English 'evil' as a conventional umbrella term of the philosophical idiom 1 in order to translate the broad-sensed Greek kakÒn, one thing should be clear: in the Neoplatonic context I am going to treat, kakÒw or 'evil' is meant to denote whatever is not in order with the world in single aspects or as a whole, or, more 'Platonically' speaking: kakÒw is whatever can be adduced as responsible for the fact that the world falls short in so many aspects of the perfection one would expect it to have considering its single and utterly good ontological origin.
The problem and its sources
In contrast to so many other urgent philosophical questions, the Neoplatonists were not able to securely mark out a coherent doctrine of evil in Plato. The 'material' they were faced with was one of scattered ad hoc utterances difficult to combine. To name just the most prominent examples:
-In Resp 611c, the s≈matow koinvn¤a is held to be the first of evils for man (which could be swiftly combined with other passages like Phaedo 67d); in other dialogues as well, Plato seems to suggest that the svmatoeid°w is the residuum of evils in other dialogues as well. -In the Theaetetus (176a), the kakÒn is insinuated to be the 'necessary ' corollary of what is good in the constitution of bodily things. -On the other hand, in Parmenides 130b-d, the possibility of an idea or of an ontological 'type' (in the sense of an absolute e‰dow) of what is bad or evil, of an absolute evil, seems to be rejected considering the timAE and the presbe¤a of ideas: there are no ideas of étimÒtata and faulÒtata. -From Resp 353 et passim, we gather the argumentum e gradibus: 'bad' or 'evil', kakÒn, would be equivalent, according to this conception, to the fact of a thing's falling short of the standards established by its ontological pattern. 'Bad' is such a thing as does not meet the expectation of realising its form, its e‰dow, to its best, mãlista t°leon. -Finally, in Laws 896/7, Plato seems to toy with the (at least) hypothesis of a kakØ cuxAE opposing the ér¤sth cuxAE in the creation of the world -a motif (perhaps all too) easily transferable to the image of the soul-chariot in the Phaedrus (247b).
All of which is obviously meant to work under the unquestioned principle that the Divine is not to be held guilty of evil(s), since it is entirely good and, as such, t«n kak«n éna¤tion (Resp 379b).
Thus, to Plotinus, who claims to give a coherent account and a unified view of Plato's philosophy (Enn. V.1 [10] . 8, [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] , the problem of evil presented itself in the following manner: evil is a deficit in the earthly realisation of normative standards, the deficit being due to the corporeal constitution of things and/or to a certain fault of the soul. Roughly speaking, a Neoplatonic answer, on these premises, would face two possibilities: [1] to blame evil on a fault of the soul (being the form-giver of the bodily cosmos, the communicator of normative standards onto earth), or [2] to link up evil with the material condition of things, and ultimately with matter itself. In the face of the difficulty of reconciling these alternatives, interpreters of Plotinus have always been tempted to opt for one of the two possibilities, developing their theories at the expense of the other one. Most scholars 2 share a view according to which Plotinus, in his old age, dismissed his earlier theory of the soul-flaw, and by the time he wrote Enn. I.8 [51] had totally adopted the explanation of evil as matter. The problem with this thesis is this: if matter is identified with evil (and even evil 'itself'), that either "brings us back to the paradox that Good makes evil" 3 (which contradicts the Platonic dogma of the égayÚn kak«n éna¤tion), or it will lead us to admit the subreptive assumption of a dualism of principlesstemming from Middle-Platonism or elsewhere -in Plotinus's thought. The latter, however, contradicts the fundamental monistic key-note and creed of his philosophy as a whole, as well as the explicit anti-dualist statements to be found -not only! -in Enn. II.9 [33] .
In contrast, a relatively small (but obviously growing) number of interpreters has tried to blame evil in the Enneads on a metaphysical fault or flaw, on the 'fall' or 'debasement' of a world-forming spiritual entitywhich, in Plotinus's philosophical 'system' (and in accordance with the motifs in Plato's Laws and Phaedrus), would have to be the 'soul'. But how could that be, if Plotinus excludes every kind of evil from the realm of the intelligible the soul inhabits (explicitly in Enn. I.8 [51] .2,25ff and ch. 4-5)?
In addition, a conflict of congruency seems to arise when one takes seriously Plotinus's position that the visible universe as a whole and the soul as pertaining to the realm of the intelligible are to be considered as good (Enn. IV.8[6] .2,1-55), but that the necessary coming together of soul and matter must be thought of as the beginning of evils due to a 'sin' (èmart¤a) of the soul (5,6).
But, as I shall try to show in what follows, there is a way to combine and reconcile both of these possibilities by proving them to be complementary in a consistent theory of evil as Plotinus conceived it. 4 For the sake of brevity, I describe simultaneous or non-temporal logical dependencies in terms of chronology (in the same way, I describe non-spatial entities in terms of 'above' and 'inferior' etc.) . In 'reality', time is brought forth only at the last stage of the procession, i.e. in the formation of the visible cosmos, as Plotinus reminds us every now and then: cf. Enn. III.7 [45].12, 22; 13, 23ff; Enn. II.4[12] .5,25f. Note Salustios's words (De dis et mundo IV 9): "Now these things never happened, but always are. And mind sees all things at once, but reason (or speech) expresses some first and others after." 5 This is a significant point: it is not the bare and dull fact or circumstance of being 2. Matter, soul, and the diffusio boni A short glimpse of both candidates -soul and matter -will be necessary: in his typical top-down-arrangement of reality generated through the ontological 'flux' coming from the one and ineffable Origin, there is one repeated pattern that Plotinus offers as an explanation (or sometimes rather as a description) of how one ontological level is derived from the other (that is, of what is frequently labelled 'emanation'). According to this explanation, a superior reality of higher ontological intensity generates a hypokeimenon, an at first completely amorphous ontological substrate meant to serve as an undetermined outlet for the further extension of being coming from 'above'. It is only by a 'posterior' 4 taking shape of its own identity (in a participation in forms) that the emanate becomes another, ontologically lower-ranging, but nevertheless well defined degree of being, a grade of reality resembling its superordinate generating reality on a lesser level. The amorphous hypokeimenon is what Plotinus calls matter, Ïlh. In this sense, the soul(-level), too, when first brought forth by the Nous, is to be considered as such an amorphous substrate and as an undefined potentiality, as 'matter' in regard (or as compared) to the already ontologically defined generating reality, as Ïlh prÚw noËn, as Plotinus says in an astounding passage of Enn. III.9 [13] .11,3/V.3. Soul becomes a reality of its own and in itself only when exercising its proper activity in imitation of and self-identifying (so to speak) distinction from the Nous. Now the hypokeimenon brought forth by the soul-level in preparation of soul's own onto-generative activity (in imitation of the Nous), is the sort of matter one could compare in a way to Aristotle's prime matter. This -as Plotinus insists -'inferior matter' is what we ex post identify as the ('in itself') structureless 'fabric', which underlies material-matter as we know it of the bodily universe. And it is only this soul-dependant inferior matter which will play a role in the following considerations concerning evil. matter, i.e. of subsisting as a structureless hypokeimenon, that raises the question of matter and evil. The hypokeimenon of the ontogenetic activity of Nous is a structureless substrate too, but it remains aloof from all evil (cf. Enn. V.9 [5].3, 22ff; Enn. II.4[12] .3,4; Enn. III.9[13].5,2; Enn. II.5 [25].3,14) . Something else, some additional problem, must be adduced if the 'inferior matter', the hypokeimenon of the soul's activity, is going to be said to have anything to do with evil(s). 6 The nohtÒn is not confined, of course, to the Nous, but denotes all levels of reality which are not corporeal, including soul as the last degree of the intelligible thus conceived. In fact, the whole of chapter 8 of Enn. II.9[33], from which this quote is taken, is dedicated to the soul. What is important is this: in Plotinus, soul and matter are to be defined as standing in a complementary relationship to one another within the dynamics of the diffusion of good and being: namely matter as the hypokeimenon of soul's self-identifying activity.
Soul, therefore, definitely does right and acts well and according to Good (which it ultimately stems from and will have to revert to) when in imitation and prolongation of what Nous does, it enables the diffusio boni by bringing forth a hypokeimenon meant to serve as a necessary substrate for a subsequent level of reality. For the intelligible (tÚ nohtÒn) 6 could not be the last [sc. level of being], for it had to have a double activity, one in itself [ §n •aut", i.e. the self-identifying activity] and one directed to something else [efiw êllo, i.e. the passing on of being to another]. There had, then, to be something after it, for only that which is the most powerless of all things (t«n pãntvn édunat≈tatvn) has nothing below it.
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The dialectics of a double activity, §n°rgeia, towards itself and towards the next lower level is a recurring thought in Plotinus:
8 every new ontological 'product' has to 'gather itself' at first, so as to constitute its own identity out of the ontological fluxus which brought it forth as an undifferentiated potentiality, as Ïlh. It is only then that it can turn to its own ontologically generative activity (the different levels a water-fountain successively fills are a handy and often used illustration of this double aspect of 'emanation' and of how to understand it: only when the upper basin nearest to the water-source is completely filled up with water, will it overflow 9 In his La matière chez Plotin, Phronesis 44 (1999), pp. 45-71, Denis O'Brien has examined this process of self-identification and reversion by interpreting several of the most cogent passages of Plotinus's works, such as Enn. V.1 [10] .7,4-6 (on p. 48f) and Enn. V.2 [11] .1,7-11 (on p. 51ff). For a handy summary of this article, one sentence taken from the English abstract will do good service: "The One or Intellect produces an undifferentiated other, which becomes Intellect or soul by itself turning towards and looking towards the prior principle, with no possibility of the One's 'turning towards' or 'seeing' itself". 10 In this interpretation I follow Denis O'Brien, La matière chez Plotin, p. 69.
to thus fill up the one beneath, and so on). For in its self-identification, every reality recognises its origin, and in attaining awareness of its first Origin, it recognises itself as a lesser image of this Origin, of Its utter One-ness (in the act of turning to itself, in the §n°rgeia §n •aut") as well as of Its perfect undiminished radiation of being (in turning its activity onto another, in its §n°rgeia efiw êllo). 9 In Enn. II.4 [12] .5,32ff, too, Plotinus explicitly lingers over the question of how everything produced by the undifferentiated flow of being obtains its proper definition by reverting towards the O/one it (ultimately) comes from (˜tan prÚw aÈtÚ §pis-trafª). This is how every ontological level produces an ontologically lesser 'alter ego', an êllo of itself (cf. Enn. V.2 [11] .1,9f: aÈtoË pepo¤hken êllo ktl.). 
What evil is made of
As long as this -roughly sketched -process develops without any impediment, everything will be in order. And it is: for this is exactly what Plotinus states of the realm of the intelligible. In the level of reality subsequent to the last degree of intelligible life, that is, to what ontologically follows the soul, however, this process seems to have been seriously interfered with in some way. It is by that 'interference' or 'damage' that what is negative comes into our bodily universe. And it is by that circumstance that the 'whence' of evil(s) is to be sought and can be found.
What I would like to show now is that this cacogenic damage has to do with the hypokeimenon of soul's activity, namely matter -and at the same time that matter cannot be simply identified with evil 'itself' merely for that reason. Strictly speaking, matter is just the last possible degree of the derivation sequence from the One. As the passage from Enn. II.9[33] quoted above shows, soul's activity produces something which lacks any proper §n°rgeia or 'actuality' and which therefore lacks any ability to identify itself ontologically by 'reversion' or by steadying itself as an 11 A differentiation in terminology is necessary at this point: Plotinus marks a clear difference between the cuxØ t«n pãntvn and the individual soul, insisting at the same time that the universal Soul remains entirely unaffected with evil(s) (Enn. I.8[51] .15,23ff; Enn. IV.8 [6] .2,1-55) since both transmit being, but on different levels and in slightly different ways. In the following, whenever I refer to '(the) soul', the individually acting spiritual entity is meant, except where Soul is put in upper case (in such occasions as would allow of speaking of Soul and soul likewise -as is the case of producing matter as its ßteron -I will simply concentrate on what individual soul does, as the rest of the argument will rely on soul's activity). For the nonetheless intimate relation of soul(s) to Soul -a relation not always easy to disentangle -I remind the reader of Enn. IV.8 [6].3,19-22. 12 Cf., among others, the passage at Enn. I.8 [51] .3,7ff: mØ¯n d¢ oÎti tÚ pantel«w mØ¯n éllÉ ßteron mÒnon toËˆntow ktl. As such, matter is "like an image of being or something still more non-existent" (ibid.). entity in its own right vis-à-vis the ontological flux. As soul 11 transmits the stream of being, it does not produce an êllo, an ontological reflection or 'alter ego' of itself, but an ontological opponent or contrary (so to speak), a negation of its energetic self, namely the t«n pãntvn édunat≈-tatvn, which is matter. Matter, considered in this way, is not an êllo of the producing soul, but rather a ßteron.
Interpreted according to the purport of the Platonic Sophistes, Plotinus considers this ontological ßteron to be ultimately mØˆn, 12 a last derivative not to be conceived of as 'something' anymore, but merely as an ontological 'chasm'. Necessarily, this last, 'meontic' degree signifies the total ebbing away or stoppage of the energetic process of successive selfdefining levels of being, and the necessary end of that process: hence the statement in Enn. II.9 [33] .8,21ff that only and finally that 'which is the most powerless of all things has nothing below it' -this might be an allusion to the necessity-formula of Theaetetus 176a as well as a reminder of Plotinus's constant rapprochement (if not identification) of §n°rgeia and oÈs¤a. So the expiration of all actuality in the ßteron-level opposite the intelligible hypostaseis signifies the end of the derivation process. This is what matter is, and this is what it should be considered as: the (though ontologically slippery, rather 'meontic') final product of a dynamic process it concludes, it depends on, and in turn affects.
Along the same lines, Plotinus metaphorically (oÂon) speaks of matter as 'begging', 'bothering' or (as Plotinus's choice of words might suggest) 'instigating' soul for the communication of form and for the transformation of its (sc. matter's) unfitness into reality: and when Plotinus explicitly speaks of how matter by this constant begging and bothering and as 13 I am sure, at any rate, that those interpreters are wrong who (like Venanz Schubert, Pronoia und Logos (Salzburg/München 1968), p. 83, just to name one example) believe that by saying this, Plotinus wilfully places a last paradox at the very bottom of the problem of evil. There is no such paradox, or at least there is a solution to the question that is not paradoxical, as I argue below.
14 The entire quote Enn. VI.7 [38] .28,7ff runs like this: éllå tÚ kakÚn p«w ¶fesin ßjei toË égayoË; µ oÈd¢ t∞n Ïlhn §n §f°sei §tiy°meya, éllÉ ÍpÒyesin §poie›to ı "matter's indefiniteness distresses it" (cf. Enn. II.4 [12] .10,34) becomes soul's evil (Enn. I.8[51] .14,35ff), then it should be clear that this statement should, or rather must be read and can only be understood clearly within the complementary context of soul's activity in the diffusion of being. As a matter of fact, the perspective Plotinus adopts is plain enough: he speaks exclusively from the soul's point of view on matter, telling how soul feels bothered by amorphous matter's simultaneous greed and incapacity for being.
It is a distinctive feature of this construction that matter displays an unexpected tendency towards good (which is form-giving) in its powerless 'will' for realisation and for transformation into being, and in its 'yearning for substance ' (Enn. III.6[26] .7,13: Ípostãsevw ¶fesiw): matter wants to, yet cannot, imitate the higher hypostaseis' self-defining reversal. Matter thus strangely partakes (if only in its own awkward way, namely ex negativo) in the principle of the bonum diffusivum sui all Neoplatonic derivation rests upon. One should stop to think about the farreaching implications and the serious consequences this Plotinian doctrine has: the very matter denounced as 'evil' and 'evil itself', by its 'nature' has an inward connection with and a laudable tendency towards Good and a (admittedly passive) role in the transmission of being, in the diffusio boni. How is this to be understood, and what has all this, as the quoted passages of the Enneads suggest, to do with evil(s) coming into the world?
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Plotinus gives a hint in ch. 28 of Enn. VI.7[38]. -Actually, Plotinus's argument is quite revealing; what makes it look like a mere 'hint' is the at first sight awkward example he embellishes his thoughts with. What Plotinus says here is, I am convinced, the following: what makes us talk of evil as equivalent to matter is the fact that amorphous matter, in its powerlessness, begs and bothers soul for the communication of form. But at the same time, matter is not able in any way to receive and to hold and contain form. Rather, and this is where the flowery language might startle the reader, forms "come upon matter like a good dream (Àsper Ùne¤ratow égayoË)" that seems to bring some order into it. lÒgow a ‡syhsin doÊw, e ‡per oÂÒn te ∑n doËnai Ólhn throËsin: éllå toË e ‡douw §pelyÒntow, Àsper Ùne¤ratow égayoË, §n kall¤oni tãjei gegon°nai. The strange fact that evil arises from something which is not active, but nonetheless 'begs' (noxious) action, is illustrated for example, I should like to think, in the Odyssey when Homer declares that "iron of itself draws a man to it" (XIX 13). Which means: wherever weapons (which 'iron' metonymically stands for) are, men will engage in bloodshed sooner or later. As in Plotinus's account of matter, one may ask: what exactly is iron's 'evil' here, iron's negative afit¤a? It is the mere fact of 'being there' or 'being at hand', and of serving in some way as a passive stimulus for some certain (and in this case deplorable) action of an active principle.
What could this obscure image of the unreal pseudo-formation of matter as if by the approach of a 'good dream' possibly mean? Plotinus once more seems to be "abounding more in ideas than in words" (noAEmasi pleonãzvn µ l°jesi): a general stylistic feature of his, as Porphyry (Vita Plotini 14,2) tells us. I attempt to render the main idea clearer by explaining the illustrative image of the dream by still another illustrative image, which I believe to be not only clarifying to a certain extent, but also serviceable for illustrating the further development of the argument where necessary. It was Leonardo da Vinci who said that to be an artist, it should suffice to copy with a pencil whatever shapes or contours one gathers from drifting clouds or from the cracks or uneven surfaces of a wall: faces, animal shapes, landscapes, in short: an entire universe of countless forms and figures.
Now in reality, neither the fissures of a wall nor cumulus clouds or their shadow-play actually have the shape of human faces or animal bodies etc.: rather, it is the observer's mind which, let leisurely loose for daydreaming, begins to shape the unstructured objects according to those structures it knows from the real world and is concerned or accustomed to deal with in real life. It is basically the psychological foundation of the Rorschach method. It is an act of shaping from the observer's side that does not reach the object which, nonetheless, gave the occasion (or the substrate) for the shape-giving daydream. When Plotinus speaks of form coming upon matter like a 'good dream', seemingly bringing structure to the 'downright structureless', he is speaking, I would suggest, of a similar situation. And he explicitly says so in another passage (Enn. III.6[26] .7,32f): forms seem to act upon matter, but do not achieve anything with it, "as if someone in a way projected shapes in the void ( §n t" [. . .] ken" morfåw efisp°m-poi)". In the same line, Enn. III.6 [26] .7,21ff reminds us: whatever announcement it [matter] makes, therefore, is a lie, and if it appears great, it is small, if more, it is less; its apparent being is not real, but a sort of 15 Of course, and this should perhaps have been said earlier, clouds are not completely structureless (as Plotinian matter is). So it is understandable that we dream forms into them when seeing their diffuse quasi-shape. -But what does soul see in the totally amorphous hypokeimenon of matter? Itself, as in a mirror, Plotinus replies (Enn. IV.3[27] .12). Soul ultimately dreams itself into matter, thus disavowing its contact with reality (which is spiritual). This, however, is a problem on the soul's side, to which I shall come back in the last paragraph of the summary to this paper. 16 In the passage from Hamlet quoted at the beginning of this article, Polonius's consent to see any animal the prince proposes in the shape of a wandering cloud is mere fawning toadyism. But the transitory nature of shapes seen in a cloud is a handy parallel of the transitory character of the bodily universe's objects and shapes. In contrast to the intelligible's, which always stay the same.
17 Cf. the motif of 'awakening' in Plotinus, who uses it to describe the re-entry from such daydreams to the 'real reality' of the intelligible. As A.H. Armstrong has put it in his chapter on Plotinus in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge 1967), p. 227: "Plotinus often describes this turning and concentration of attention upwards as 'waking': and waking ourselves up from our dream-like obsession with the needs and desires of our lower self in the world of the senses is for him a difficult process requiring vigorous intellectual and moral selfdiscipline".
18 Cf. O'Brien, La matière chez Plotin, p. 45: "Since matter is lifeless, it cannot fleeting frivolity (oÂon pa¤gnion feËgnon); hence the things which seem to come to be in it are frivolities, nothing but phantoms in a phantom, like something in a mirror which really exists in one place but is reflected in another, etc.
Soul indulges in the idle dream of transferring forms onto amorphous matter, taking them from the intelligible realm and 'more real reality' soul pertains to and basically stays in forever. 15 Yet this process of shaping the amorphous remains entirely on the soul's side and does not reach matter nor have an effect on it, just as our daydreams, which remain solely in our minds, do not objectively bring clouds into shape. 16 This awkward situation made Plotinus observe that due to the formlessness of matter, objects appear to be where they in reality are not (Enn. III.6[26].7, 17 -because in reality the forms remain within the soul. Plotinus presents us here with a strange hylemorphistic negation of hylemorphism -but a fitting piece of his philosophy entirely in accord with his fundamental ideas and basic conceptions, let alone his eagerness to interpret Plato flawlessly. And of a piece with Plotinus's theory of evil, too, as I want to outline in the following. Because matter's complete incapability of form-reception and inaccessibility for structure, as well as soul's complementary drifting away in daydreams when making this inert matter the object of its natural tendency of the 'transmission' of forms 18 will show the way to a better solution of the matter-evil problem.
turn towards its source. Soul therefore has to be herself directly responsible both for the production of matter and for the covering of matter with form". 19 It is true that, as I said in the beginning, the Greek kakÒn has the meaning of 'base' or 'incapable' etc., too. But that would never justify the identification of the 'base' and 'unfit' with 'evil itself'. Moreover, it is important to avoid the mistake of calling a thing 'bad' just because there are others that are better. Augustine has a good observation of this, as he asks in Ad Simplicianum I 2,8: Quo enim merito sol factus est sol, aut quid offendit luna ut tanta illo inferior, vel quid promeruit ut sideribus ceteris tanto clarior crearetur? Sed haec omnia bona creata sunt quaeque in genere suo.
Evil arising
So far, matter's relation to soul (and vice versa) has been discussed. At least two things should be clear by now.
First: although Plotinus speaks of matter as inert, structureless, powerless, and obnoxiously incapable, etc., this does not render matter ipso facto evil. 19 The édunat≈tatvn t«n pãntvn is a necessary, as to 'place' and 'function' in its own way fitting (though admittedly unfit), and appropriate constituent of reality as a whole. It has its proper place and sense within this derivation process and to consider it outside of this process is impossible and methodologically doubtful. Matter qua passive potentiality is nothing in itself but all-dependent on others. 'Matter itself' is an oxymoron, to a certain extent, for Plotinus, and always to be referred to as if written in quotation marks, and this should duly arouse suspicions whenever a trite identification of matter and 'evil itself' is proposed.
Second: matter does not always (and therefore all talk of 'per se' or 'by its nature' etc. is rendered obsolete) instigate soul to perform an inadequate waste of form-transmission on its amorphous hypokeimenon. From case to case, soul profitably and agreeably 'dreams' forms into matter, and the most prominent example of this achievement is the universe as a whole, which like a living, perfect and beautiful work of art is an accomplished and joyful projection of forms by the world-Soul, the artifex mundi, into matter (which is why Plato praises the cosmos as a 'blessed God': Enn. IV. 20 All the same, in distinguishing the 'two matters', 'lower' and 'upper', Plotinus solves a problem Plato left unanswered: whether matter has a good disposition for receiving form (as in Timaeus 56c), or a negative inertness (as Politicus 273bc might suggest, among other passages). Plotinus can answer this traditional dilemma: on principle, matter ('lower' and 'upper' ) is a mere hypokeimenon and therefore by 'essence' disposed to receive form, as the Timaeus has it. Yet 'lower' matter displays an utter inability to be formed and by its total passiveness is liable to overstrain its form-giving principle, soul.
21 This is not a paradox, either. It just seems to be one to the modern reader. I have tried to disentangle Plotinus's doctrine of the 'fallen soul' and its èmart¤a in a previous article: Tragische Schuld im Theatrum Mundi Plotins, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 40 (1998), pp. 33-56, and again in Unde Malum, pp. 69-104. 22 Matter is an afit¤a simply 'by its presence', Plotinus says in a fabulous passage on soul's relation to matter which ends like this: "soul would not have come to it [matter, that is] unless its presence had given soul the occasion of coming to birth" (Enn. I.8[51].14,54f ).
ets, are corporeal, hence material (Ïlhw paroÊshw), but are free of all evil (tÚ kakÚn mØ pare›nai): Enn. I.8 [51] .5,31-35. So it is not by the mere presence of matter that a presence of evil can be diagnosed, which makes it difficult to believe that matter in Plotinus can be salva veritate commuted with evil. -In consequence, even 'lower' matter is not ipso facto the carrier or bearer of evil, let alone evil itself, and therefore not per se the cause for whatever is not in order with the world. 20 And neither is the form-bringing S/soul-principle, of course. And neither matter nor soul is to be considered as evil in actu, since both do definitely serve the diffusio boni.
Yet, evils come into the world exactly when both, soul and matter, get in contact in the constitution of the bodily cosmos. It is, of course, the formative principle of individual reality -and not the world-Soul -whose activity upon matter is the problem here. Plotinus has given the question of the (individual) soul's 'fall' a great deal of thought. He speaks of soul's 'lapse' and 'mistake' (or should we venture to translate 'sin': èmart¤a?) and 'forgetfulness' etc. But at the same time, he wants to maintain that there is no evil in the realm of the intelligible. It takes another entire opusculum to explain this only prima facie inconsistency in Plotinus in detail. 21 Yet, what has been said about matter so far, should help for an understanding of what happens here in respect to the origin of evil(s): in its (anthropomorphically speaking:) 'deplorable' condition of complete powerlessness and formlessness, matter by merely being there (not by acting on its own initiative) 22 incites soul to act upon it, to 'make something out of it', to follow its natural §n°rgeia efiw êllo. Matter 'does' nothing here, it is just what it was always meant to be: the hypokeimenon of soul's naturally defining activity.
In a sense, soul's experience of and relation to matter is comparable to our everyday experience of and relation the future. Our perception of the future is that of a mere potentiality, a vast outlet for our prospective acting, and nothing in itself; it is just what 'we make of it', but then again, as soon as we take action 'making the future', the future is no more, it ceases to be the future and as soon as it is realised, it becomes 'something' which is not the future anymore. All the same, the future 'bothers us' and 'begs' for action, for being moulded and forged. The future, one could say, is a 'meontic' pure openness of possibilities and as soon as this openness is closed down to one possibility, reality comes to be. Still, the future is not as ontologically slippery a concept as structureless matter in Plotinus, as should be clear from what has been said so far about matter's status. This is where the comparison lets us down.
In its utter incapacity for epistrophic self-identification matter needs to be ontologically replenished, 'reverted towards Good', by another (as Plotinus insists, for instance, in Enn. II. .10,35) as long as forms do not come to it, does in fact 'bother' soul and lets soul assume the task matter cannot accomplish: to form and to confer being to the structureless hypokeimenon. A futile task, as the reader knows by now. Therefore it is (rather: it can be from case to case) a mistake for the soul to turn its attention to matter, though a highly laudable mistake, since soul is devoted to the diffusio boni. Accordingly, Plotinus can maintain his dogma of the utter goodness of the intelligible realm and at the same time explain how and why it is that soul's activity in the bodily sphere can have evil(s) as a consequence: it is because soul's entirely well motivated intentions of form-giving despair vis-à-vis matter's completely amorphous inability to be formed, to be 'mastered by form ' (Enn. I.8[51] .5,24). This passive resistance to the communication of form and the frustration of soul's §n°rgeia efiw êllo it brings with it, make it clear why matter is called 'evil' in the Enneads. But it should be equally clear now that when Plotinus calls matter evil, this can only be meant within a dynamic process it stands in, depending on and (passively) acting on others. Finally, it should be clear that evils belong to the ontic world, to the (according to Enn. VI. 24 This is what Plotinus says when defining the phenomenon of matter-evil in its 'essence' as a strictly relational term and therefore speaks of evil being "unmeasuredness in relation to (prÒw) measure, and unboundedness in relation to limit, and formlessness in relation to formative principle, and perpetual neediness in relation to what is self-sufficient; always undefined, nowhere stable, subject to every sort of influence, insatiate, complete poverty: and all this is not accidental to it but in a sort of way its essence ('oÈs¤a')" (Enn. I. evil, however, does not necessarily have to be a fixed, or at least determinable, ontological 'item' (to choose a term as vague as possible), as soul and matter are, but rather has to be identified with an ontological state of affairs, with a metaphysical dynamics of correct or incorrect encounters and couplings of such ontological 'items' or 'factors', etc.
Lloyd P. Gerson was right, therefore, when he spoke up against the facile identification of matter and evil to be found in most interpreters of Plotinus: he straightens out the scholarly discussion by pointing out that the kakÒn is not simply to be considered matter (sans phrase), but, and this makes a big difference, "matter viewed in relation to form and Good". 23 It is indeed the ever insatiable dependence of matter on form and Good which is the metaphysical pr«ton kakÒn, since 'form'/'shape' means being, and, in turn, shapelessness is matter's 'fÊsiw' or 'oÈs¤a', as it were.
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Matter's neediness and simultaneous incapacity for receiving form, its 'relational oÈs¤a', is the centre of Plotinus's doctrine of evil. 25 The receiving of being kayÉ˜son dÊnatai (cf. Enn. II.9[33].3,1ff), which constituted the different ontological intensities and well-defined degrees of being so far, is lead ad absurdum in matter's unlimited receptiveness which has no measure kayÉ˜son anymore.
Earlier I compared matter's status to the status of the future as always mere potentiality. There is another comparison to everyday experience of 26 Once more O'Brien seems to have hit the nail on the head when he says: "Soul will forever cover with form the formlessness and the disfigurement of the object whose appearance is a consequence of her own movement away from the higher principles 'towards herself' (cf. Enn. III.9[13].3,7-16). Not that the movement was itself evil. The soul becomes evil, not in the making of matter, but only as a possible consequence of her activity in covering with form the object to which she has given birth" (Plotinus on Matter and Evil, in: Ll.P. Gerson (ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge 1996), p. 190) . 27 That st°rhsiw is meant to be an êrsiw, a 'nullification' or a 'frustration', can easily be deduced from Enn. II.4 [12] .13,23ff (êrsiw går ≤ st°rhsiw, etc.). As to how a 'passive st°rhsiw' can be conceived of, see, for example, Hubert Benz, Materie und Wahrnehmung in der Philosophie Plotins (Würzburg 1990), p. 127. potentiality I should like to adduce in order to show how potentiality can be conceived of by us as noxious or even 'evil'. It is Plato himself who warns his readers that money as mere possibility can work disastrously on humans. What he thinks of is, of course, the devastating effect money (as compared to valuable 'things') can have on a man's pleonej¤a, precisely because money is not an 'object': there are two constituents, one wanting everything, the other allowing the acquisition of everything by in itself being nothing, and this will go haywire. That matter is mere potentiality without being something (at least, of any worth) 'in itself' might be even more patent to us, whose money is no longer made of precious metals, than to Plato's contemporaries. Yet, normative assessment comes in here more drastically: paper (or virtual) currency, being close to nothing by itself, is mere possibility, and its 'meontic' status diminishes in the measure that it is spent, or 'realised', turned into objects, etc. Yet, we know perfectly well what those people mean who say that money has a negative influence on people, and that money is 'dangerous', noxious, and finally might be 'bad' because it is just open potentiality. This is why matter is to be considered a privation, corruption, obstruction, and disturbance of soul's -on principle -positive and laudable activity. 26 This also explains the concept of evil as st°rhsiw by matter to be found in Enn. I.8 [51] .11,1ff, among other loci: soul's activity is rendered futile and diminished by matter's passive inertness, and it is as absurd and futile as any of our attempts to shape cumulus clouds 'in reality' by thinking forms into them would be. This evil-qua-st°rhsiw definition, too, exemplifies how evil by its 'essence' depends on the coming together of two constituents, since 'st°rhsiw' has no reasonable significance in itself and obtains its sense only when we include a defining relational 'of what' in its definition. 27 Matter's st°rhsiw or êrsiw to soul's natural activity, its 28 In Plotinus's eyes the reversion of the upper emanate is at the same time the reversion of the lower emanate it penetrates with being. The two energies he speaks of in Enn. II.9[33].8,29ff thus complement each other in the reversion of all towards the highest Being. There are frequent allusions to this idea that the higher reality contains the lower one(s) and lifts it (them) up in its own upward movement throughout the Enneads: Enn. IV.3[27].9,34ff; VI.9[9].3,3ff; VI.4 [22] .1,7; V.5[32].9,30.
29 By this explanation of how the metaphysical kakÒn is the pattern of 'natural' and moral kakã, I of course allude to the common classification of evils as established by Leibniz (Essais de théodicée I §21). But still, one must beware: the modern classification never can do justice to the ample concept of 'evil' in Neoplatonic philosophy, and perhaps any good Neoplatonist would have rejected it. In this line, just to mention one difficulty out of many, the term 'natural evil' is to be understood as a façon de parler: evil is never natural to Plotinus, but strictly contra naturam.
30 I would never dare to construe such an imaginative example, if it were not for Plotinus himself hinting at it over and over again: cf., for instance, Enn. VI.9[9].8,16ff; IV.3 [27] .17,21ff; I.8 [51] .13,17f. The motif of the 'bottomless' waters of the utterly reduction of soul's formative task to Sisyphean toil, results objectively in 'natural evils', the sufferings soul experiences when ordering the bodily universe, i.e. pains, sicknesses, hunger, deformities, as well as ugliness and other imperfections and troublesome hindrances and shortcomings of all kinds, in short, the kakã we suffer (cf. Enn. IV.8[6].2,44ff; Enn. V.9[5].10,4ff; Enn. I.8[51].5,23ff; et passim). The 'subjective' consequences are to be found in soul's further involvement in a mere mirrorreality of imperfect form-dreams, an entanglement which paralyses and hardens it, which dilutes its attention and turns it away from what it should do (which is to revert towards Good and to live in the sphere of the intelligible and the true forms) 28 and perverts or darkens its perception of what is real and right. This is what Plotinus understands by 'moral evil(s)', that is sin, wickedness, and everything else which, as Plotinus fears, will drag us deeper into the morass of 'natural evils': Enn. I.8 [51] . 15,13-23; 5,20-26; etc. 29 It is as if soul spontaneously and without further reflection rushed into a life-threatening situation with the commendable intention of helping a drowning child crying for assistance, and as if this unselfish (or should we say: self-forgetful?) deed almost led to both of them drowning, soul not having been strong enough to keep both of them afloat. Nobody will rightly reproach either of them for this: neither the drowning non-swimmer's cry for help nor the would-be rescuer's attempt to render aid can be called evil. Evil as a consequence of the two of them coming together in the difficult rescue has, if not positive, at least no negative, 'evil' or 'bad' premises. 30 different goes back to Plato (Politicus 273de). 'Drowning' is also the leitmotiv of the frequent allusions Plotinus makes to the Narcissusmyth, comparing soul to the man who wanted to get hold of his own image on the water, not considering it was only a reflection, and drowning in the attempt -a myth whose illustrations can nicely be brought into agreement and matched with what I said before about the dreaming of forms onto matter: cf. Enn. I.6[1].8,6-15. Once more, I should like to draw the reader's attention to a quote from O'Brien, Plotinus on matter and evil, p. 190: "The soul's excessive absorption in caring for the things of this world has the tragic consequence that the soul herself becomes evil, because of the nature of the object that she cares for. The soul becomes evil when she does so, because the object of her care is 'evil itself'". Note that from this point of view, O'Brien couldn't help, just as I can't, putting the term 'evil-itself' in gnomic commas.
31 Enn. I.8[51] .10,1f. When I say that evil cannot be defined as an 'as such' or 'in itself', I share the same view of those who believe it to be prime evil sans phrase. Cf. the remark made by O'Meara, Das Böse bei Plotin, p. 37: "Wir erkennen das Gute, indem wir den determinierten vielfältigen Ausdruck des Guten im intelligiblen Sein erfassen. So könnte auch das absolute Böse erkennbar werden, indem wir Gestaltungen des Bösen im körperlichen Sein begreifen können", and, on the following page: "Auch kann ein Begriff [. . .] des absoluten Bösen entwickelt werden, indem man die Eigenschaften des Guten verneint". -Note that O'Meara correctly recognises that just as Good is only good insofar as it does good, evil is admitted to be evil only insofar as it does evil. As 'Good' is beyond all good and therefore in itself not good but morethan-good and more-than-being (as §p°keina t∞w oÈs¤aw), matter is not in itself evil, but less-than-evil since it is ¶jv t«nˆntvn, below the realm of all manifestation of evil(s).
It is in an almost 'tragic' shift of circumstance that the interpreter learns why, when speaking of the unending dynamics of ontological generation and reversion, Plotinus calls matter evil: curiously, he does so for the same reasons that would definitely forbid him to call matter 'as such' (if that wasn't an oxymoron) and in an impossible vision as disconnected from the prÒodow, 'evil (itself)'. As we contemplate matter for philosophical investigation's sake as if it were conceivable as something (with)in itself (which it isn't, since it never emerged as 'in itself' from the flux of being), we seem indirectly to grasp a negative notion of it as not being, as mere passive dÊnamiw, as ontologically void of reality etc., in short: as the very pre-ontic substratum all matter is without ipso facto being evil. Matter 'is not' in the sense that it is not yet, but 'as such' awaits being, which is not being evil, leave alone evil in a sense so intensive as to speak of it as 'evil itself' and all evils' evil: êpoiow d¢ oÔsa p«w kakAE, Plotinus is right to ask. 31 The answer he has to this question is revealing, since it shows a) that evil is not to be considered as an entity, but as privation, i.e. in relational terms; and that b) evil is therefore not a ÍpÒstasiw in 32 Enn. I.8 [51] .10,13-11,4. As to why I hold the l°getai to indicate a 'so-to-speak', cf. infra point 5. on Proclus and Plotinus, the concluding paragraph of this article. 33 This passage illustrating the dynamic coherence of the whole of Plotinus's ontology shows that I should clarify what I said in footnote 31: for whilst the One (or the Good) can to a certain extent be treated as a hypostasis 'in itself', 'isolating' it, as it were, argumenti causa from the context of the realities 'after' it -since all those depend on it whereas it does not in any way depend on them -everything following the One and Good in the prÒodow of being can only be grasped as inserted in the dynamics of the progressive diffusion, and in relation to the preceding realities, which in the most intensive case is true for matter as being totally 'in relation to other(s)' and nothing 'in itself'.
itself, but merely co-exists §n êllƒ. Believe your eyes: Plotinus is saying exactly what Proclus says when allegedly criticising Plotinus and when in fact criticising the doctrine of matter's identification with evil. Plotinus's wording comes as close to a parupÒstasiw-definition of evil as it possibly can without using the term itself:
For it is not called (l°getai) evil because it has, but rather because it has not quality; so that perhaps it would not be evil if it was a form (e‰dow) instead of a nature opposed to form. But the nature opposed to form is privation; but privation is always in something else and has no existence by itself (d¢ ée‹ §n êllƒ ka‹ §pÉ aÈt∞w oÈx ÍpÒstasiw).
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As we attempt to define matter 'in itself', we must at the same time admit that we cannot. At least not if we take Plotinus's philosophy seriously. Speaking of matter as if it were something kayÉ aÍtÒ is dubious in the Plotinian context, and if Plotinus himself does so, he has something else specifically in mind, as I shall presently show (cf. below, step [5] in the summary). Matter as mere potentiality is all-dependent on realisation 'from above', is ontologically all-'awaiting' and nothing else. Matter can only be adequately grasped (if ever) when seen within the dynamics of the ontological process whithin which it makes sense as the final constituent. And the same is true for Plotinus's doctrine of 'matter as evil': the 'other', which matter awaits being from, is soul, and it is as a constituent of the by nature interrelated prÒodow and return that matter can become a lethal trap for its formative principle whose action it passively provoked by just being at hand as a totally indeterminate substratum for soul's natural §n°rgeia efiw êllo. An §n°rgeia, on the other hand, which was not meant to be wasted on an absurd losing of the soul's self to the mere 'mirror' of matter, but to be the energy of reversion towards the higher truths and real forms. 34 To mention only one example of one of the major exponents of that shift in interpreting Plotinus: Pierre Hadot, Plotinus or The Simplicity of Vision, Chicago/London 1993 (in the same line, the book review of Werner Beierwaltes in Gnomon 72 (2000), pp. 202-207, is highly interesting).
35 Dominic O'Meara, throughout his Plotinus, makes a strong point in favour of adopting a perspective ex parte rerum recipientium (as Thomas Aquinas put it), and correctly so. Consequently, he advocates the use of the term 'derivation' (which describes the procession from a perspective quoad nos) in place of the traditional 'emanation'. 36 Two or three examples taken from Enn. I.8[51] may stand for all others: 7,12-14; 14,38-455; in the latter passage in particular, matter is called 'evil' because (to¤nun, êra . . .) it causes soul's evils. The conclusion of the Ennead (15,13-29) is entirely 'subjective' in its ways of treating the problem and speaks from soul's point of view.
Sola sub nocte per umbras
There is one key-note to Plotinus's treatises that should not be underestimated: it is not in vain that recent scholarly works increasingly insist on the predominance of the dynamics in Plotinus, on calling his philosophy one of experience rather than a rigid 'system', 34 on speaking of ontological 'derivation' (i.e. quoad nos) rather than 'objectively' of 'emanation'. 35 Recent interpretation shows a strong tendency to more frequently recognise the human subject as the centre of attention in Plotinus's treatises, and to consider the grand world-picture the Enneads draw as a reflection of the intellect-gifted subject's inner self.
As a consequence, Plotinus's language is -almost paraeneticallymoulded to fit the soul's point of view within the 'system' (what other viewpoint should a human thinker adopt?), and to express adequately this emphasis on the inner experience, on the objectively subjective.
36 This 'agent-relative' point of view and form of expression (as opposed to an 'agent-neutral' one which, I insist, seems to be quite dubious if attributed to Plotinus) explains Plotinus's calling matter evil: as I tried to show, there is no such thing as a 'matter itself' that is to be identified with 'evil'. When Plotinus speaks of evil matter and matter as evil, he does so by adopting or even cleaving to soul's point of view in performing its activity on matter, a point of view that does not permit the conclusion that matter as evil means matter is evil, but that soul perceives matter qua evil, and not before coming upon it. In a way, this resembles the Greek concept of the élhy°w, which implies or presupposes an object 'capable' of being grasped (of being é-lhyAEw) as corresponding to the subject capable of grasping it. Plotinus might have something like this in mind in referring 37 Let me be clear on this: I do not say that Plotinus's speaking of matter as evil is just a façon de parler like our referring to the evening sky as melancholy, which is a variety of metonymical talk and therefore to be considered a (mere) rhetorical device -telling as it may be. However, the allagé adiectivi can serve as an analogy for the enallagé of thoughts or of viewpoints within a philosophical 'system' we encounter here and that I want to stress; more importantly, it can illustrate the shift from an 'agent-neutral' point of view and language all too readily presumed for the interpretation of the Plotinian treatises to an 'agent-relative' point of view and form of expression in Plotinus's account of evil and render it plausible (I apologise by the way for usurping the 'agent-'terminology which has ist own distinct place and meaning in the contemporary moral and social philosophy where it originated).
to the truth of being and the problem of meontic evil in Enn. I.8 [51] .6,44-47, as well as in calling (as he frequently does) matter an 'ontological lie': cf. the passage Enn. II.6 [26] .7,21ff quoted above.
Matter qua evil or -in this 'actual' way of speaking -'evil matter' is, I want to suggest, to be taken as a methodical enallagé of thoughts (which perhaps is a better word for it than 'pathetic fallacy'): just as in the allagé adiectivi we make use of without much ado and with great adequacy for what we want to say, when we speak of the 'melancholy evening sky'. The evening sky is not melancholy, nor is it in any way capable of being so. What we express here in a most natural turn of speech is the 'quoad nos' of the evening sky, the (e)motion it evokes within us who are capable of melancholy, but which at the same time comes from within us, and not from the contemplation of the evening sky -though we would most probably not be affected by melancholy if it had not been for the evening sky which just happened to be there and which met our eye and attention. What makes the evening sky melancholy is what it stands for in soft or crying colours: the end of the day, the termination of labours accomplished or not, things awaiting us tomorrow, etc.
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As I have tried to point out, there are good reasons for not trusting a trite and all too heedless 'wrongly objective' identification of matter 'per se' and evil 'in itself' in Plotinus. The severe contradictions, paradoxes, and inconsistencies arising within the philosophy of Plotinus itself if such an all too simplistic identification -which renders matter the salva veritate substitute of evil -is admitted, are due not only to the astonishing readiness of interpreters to let an 'early Plotinus' plainly contradict a 'late Plotinus', or a self-confessed monist a latent dualist, etc. They are also an effect of not perceiving that Plotinus's thoroughly dynamic and 'actual' view on philosophy renders his language a less doctrinal and more experience-centred one than many 'scholastic' interpretations can grasp. I take 38 As John Dillon has put it in his introduction to MacKenna's translation of the Enneads: "The entire system is assumed in each of the separate treatises, which mole the form of special developments or demonstrations of significant points, not chapters in one work of consecutive exposition" (Plotinus: The Enneads. Ed. J. Dillon, translated by S. MacKenna, Harmondsworth 1991, p. xxx).
39 Cf. Enn. I.8[51].6,58: ple›ston éllAElvn kex≈ristai. And 6,41: §nant¤a tå ple›ston éllAElvn éfesthkÒta ktl.
his -otherwise conceptually helpless -remarks on, or rather, as I feel free to say now: 'theory' of evil to be a good example of this.
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I am quite aware of the fact that my interpretation seems to contradict some Plotinian utterances to be found (especially) in ch. 13 of Enn. I. 8[51] . This is where Plotinus says that evil and evil's effects should not be separated from one another so as to possibly call one of them evil and the other one not: Enn. I.8 [51] .13,2ff. At the same time, Plotinus insists that by kak¤a he does not merely signify a simple §mpÒdion tª cuxª, an impediment to the soul, but that the kak¤a presupposes an aÈtÚ kakÒn which is its cause (13,4ff; cf. 14.50: kak¤aw afit¤a). I shall briefly try at least to outline how my interpretation absorbs and integrates these -prima facie considered -'threats' to its main tenets.
First, my interpretation explicitly avoids what Plotinus holds to be an interpretive mistake of his account of evil. For in the agent-relative interpretation presented on the preceding pages, no division of being and effect is proposed at all. On the contrary, 'passive' or 'negative' effect and 'potential' or 'meontic' being are taken to be necessarily the same in the special case of evil. And this must have been Plotinus's view as well, I think, and very probably the reason for this warning: for mark that Plotinus does otherwise identify matter and its privative effects downright, and insists on matter being a depriving impediment to the soul's activity (taÈtÒn, he calls them in Enn. II.4[12] .16,3; and the kakÒn is presented as the matter of fact of privation in Enn. I.8 [51] .1,19: [tÚ kakÚn d¢] …w st°rhsiw, just to mention two examples).
Perhaps one more observation in this context. Even in his attempt to give a close-to-ontological definition of matter's 'otherness', namely in calling it the mØ oÈs¤a as opposed to the true oÈs¤a of the first Principles, Plotinus cannot but make his point by referring -énaba¤nvn and kataba¤nvn -to their "furthest possible separation from each other" 39 within the procession of being, and by clearly stating that Good and evil are opposed to each other insofar as they are acting or act-inciting érxa¤ and 40 This corresponds to the opening remarks on the Good in the same treatise. Here too the Good is presented not as something 'in itself', but as the érxAE, as "that on which everything depends and to which all beings aspire; they have it as their principle and need it", etc.: Enn. I.8[51]2,1-8, et passim. Note how evil is opposed to Good, then: as that which entirely depends on others, which aspires to being, is not an ontological principle at all, and is needy in every aspect. All these are strictly relative classifications.
41 I am almost sure that there is much more to the pun §j éntiy°tvn sun°sthke than just the meaning 'being made up of opposites'. I fail to come up with a better translation, but at least it should be clear that the expression cannot possibly refer to the ontological 'constitution' of Good and evil as 'assembled' or 'put together' by 'elements' of heterogeneous origin, or the like. 42 Plotinus compares this to virtuous life which does not give an idea of the good yet, but is its manifestation. Analogously, kak¤a is to be considered a manifestation of the kakÒn: Enn. I.8 [51] .13,6f. But at the same time, he maintains that it is by entering the dynamics of the ontological scaling that virtue puts us on track for an understanding of the Good (cf. ibid.: épÚ t∞w éret∞w énaba¤nvn ktl.). And this is crucial: the phenomenon subjacent to all manifestations is correctly understood by the 'agentrelative' shift, solely énaba¤nvn and kataba¤nvn on the ontological scale, as the soul does by nature, since it is "like an amphibian", pertaining to the intelligible world, but living, as it were, in the bodily realm, descending and ascending constantly: cf. Enn. Second, what Plotinus wants to get at in Enn. I.8 [51] .13 is, and a more detailed scrutiny of the text should be able to prove it, that the different forms evil manifests itself in and which we perceive as evil(s) and might be all too willing to declare to be ultimate evil(s) -since immediacy is a mighty goddess, as a classicist friend of mine used to say -, are not evil itself, but evils qua varieties of the manifestations of the one pr«ton kakÒn. Plotinus simply states that the 'multiform' phenomena of evil(s) are not to be mistaken for their 'uniform' cause, and that their analysis and their understanding does not yet give an answer to what brought them forth. In short: that in order to understand evil at its root, one must go beyond the analysis of 'physical', 'natural', or 'moral' evil(s) and show what their underlying 'metaphysical' evil is whose mere manifestation(s) they are. 42 Or think of the (pr«ton) kakÒn-kakã distinction as remotely analogous to the famous concept-conception distinction in John Rawls's IV.8.4,32. -It is thus that W.R. Inge called soul the "wanderer of the metaphysical world" (The Philosophy of Plotinus, p. 203).
43 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge/Mass. 1971. On the concept-conception distinction see section 9 of the book.
Theory of Justice:
43 at least in the way that Rawls's 'concept' (of justice, in his case) means (as the kakÒn-concept in Plotinus does) a fundamental understanding (of the problem), whereas 'conceptions' (not unlike the Plotinian kakã) are singular implementations and applications of this understanding from case to case. It is wrong to rashly imply, however, that the kakÒn, aÈtÚ kakÒn or pr«ton kakÒn addressed here must be the ominous 'matter itself' construction. Rather, I should like to maintain, it is a unique (so to speak) and typically conditioning pattern (hence the aÈtÒ and the pr«ton, which both are used 'Platonically' in order to express this factor of being a conditioning 'type') of a failed coming together of soul and matter which Plotinus refers to here. At the same time, he insists on the fact that when he calls this kakÒn matter, he does so by referring to the processual contrariety becoming manifest between matter and good within the aurea catena of being, and by an understanding coming from the 'agent-relative' view on the eternal dynamics of the ontological katãbasiw and énãbasiw (Enn. I.8 [51] .13,12-16). In Enn. II. 4[12] , too, the account of matter as mØˆn depends on the ontological procession and its qualifyability in 'ups' and 'downs': on matter's 'distance' from the First, its complete 'otherness' from being, etc. It should be evident by now why this is Plotinus's method in talking about evil and matter and what they have to do with each other: matter cannot be grasped as 'in itself' or 'as such'; but énaba¤nvn and kataba¤nvn, soul gets into contact with matter, experiencing it as pure potentiality and occasionally as evil.
A bold summary
A brief synopsis of what has been said on matter and evil in Plotinus can be given, I am confident, in some sort of short 'catechism' of seven little steps. With these seven steps, I hardly pretend to do more than to give an exegesis of what Plotinus summarises in Enn. I.8 [51] .14,38-55:
[1] Matter, in Plotinus's view of the prÒodow, is necessary and necessarily structureless, a void hypokeimenon, and strictly êpoiow. [3] Plotinus's answer is: though completely passive, matter 'stimulates' the soul to act upon it, 44 but since matter is completely structureless, individual soul's Sisyphean action upon it, from case to case (and, in effect, in most cases), is painfully in vain, which is how evil(s) come into the universe, as shown. The kakÒn at the root of the kakã is to be found in the inadequate or miscarried relation of soul's formative agency on inert matter, not in soul or matter 'per se'.
[4] So why does Plotinus call matter evil at all?
[5] He does so by expressing an enallagé of thoughts in agreement with his 'agent-relative' way of 'doing philosophy'. Metonymical expressions are an almost typical stylistic feature in Plotinus and denote the perspective of the philosophical 'agent' speaking. Cf. Plotinus's repeated references to forms ordering and shaping matter when 'in reality' (which he discloses in just one remote passage and cryptically enough, as he obviously cannot state it directly) he thinks that forms never do order matter, but that souls (as relative agents) 'dream forms towards matter', matter remaining without forms and forms remaining within the soul's realm just as our daydreams remain within our minds and do not shape clouds whatsoever. 45 As Plotinus explains in Enn. VI.7 [38] .28,7ff, the prior perspective, now rectified by allusion to how things really behave, was presented as if we made an unreal assumption (ÍpÒyesiw) in order to shortcut the demonstration. I should claim that talking about matter as if it were something 'in itself' and about matter as evil are such 'agent-neutral' shorthand ways of talking as well. Plotinus states this, in fact, in Enn. I.8[51].5,11-13: "when we say it 'is', we are just using the same word for two different things, and the true way of speaking is to say it 'is not'". -oÈx …w to›w r É hmasi l°getai oÏtv ka‹ tÚ élhy¢w ¶xein, Plato's Phaedo (102b) reminds us about our references to relations. 291 talk in a shorthand way about relations we have with ourselves and one another. The normative demands of meaning and reason are not demands that are made on us by objects, but are demands that we make on ourselves and each other." In an analogous way, one might say about Plotinus's account of evil: to talk about evil is not to talk about an entity, but to talk in a shorthand way about relations within the Plotinian procession and between soul and matter. Evil as the érxh of evils is not an object, but an outcome of such miscarried relations. 47 Strictly speaking, this is utterly impossible considering Plato's doctrine that there can be no fid°a or e‰dow of bad things. And that 'evil itself', and therefore an entity (by 'self-predication') entirely evil, is impossible in Plotinus's eyes as well, is clearly stated for instance in Enn. I.8 [51] .15,23f: tÚ d¢ kakÚn oÈ mÒnon §st‹ kakÒn. And Plotinus adds why: diå dÊnamin égayoË ka‹ fÊsin (15,24) -a perfect account of evil as depending on the ontological procession in the concluding lines of the treatise on evils and whence they come.
48 This is perfectly consistent with Plotinus's observation that "if evil occurs accidentally in something else, it must be something itself (ti aÈtÒ) first, even if it is not a substance (mØ oÈs¤a)" (Enn. I.8 [51] .3,22f. And, equally, with his statement in 3,35-40, where the kakoË oÈs¤a is seriously questioned, but a pr«ton kakÒn and a kayÉ
[6] But can that be maintained in the face of the fact that Plotinus even calls matter the prime evil or the aÈtÚ kakÒn etc.? [7] The above interpretation of Enn. I.8 [51] .13 can serve as a clue: there must be something underlying to the phenomenal forms of the kakã, and these should just be taken as different expressions of one subjacent pattern or common origin: just as different sorts of unvirtuous actions are not kak¤a in its all-encompassing form which we might call the aÈtØ kak¤a; but they all definitely revert to it. Now what is the 'type' (negatively spoken) of all these different occurrences, what is the one kakÒn at the very bottom of all the different kakã? Well, firstly: something which as a 'type' of multiple occurrences can be Platonically called a 'first evil' or aÈtÚ kakÒn, and which can be seen as such a thing independently of all accidental determinations and singular circumstances, i.e., a metaphysical pattern. And secondly: it does not necessarily have to be something in the sense of some entity or principle 47 or -in the worst of cases -a 'substance', and I should like to argue: not even in the sense of a proto-substantial hypokeimenon such as matter might be conceived. The kakÒn as presented by Plotinus can be a -paradigmatic, in a negative and passive waystate of affairs, a flaw, a misconnection, an 'event', etc. as well. And it is. It is such a flaw and combination defect in the sense explained in [3] , and particular evils are its concrete multiple outcomes.
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Compare it to (and forgive me the sorrowfully German thought to aÍtÚ kakÒn is conserved all the same. Finally, in 5,9-13, an ˆntvw kakÒn is denied and evil's 'being' denounced as a shortcut expression of naming what is not a being.
follow) such obviously recurring events in the course of history that could make us believe in 'circular history', in history repeating itself: there is no 'substance' at the root of all this; just a pattern of all too human standard relationships (and their failure) that obviously won't pass away.
These are only a few and fairly small steps, and they are easily reconcilable with Plotinus's illustrative and elliptical idiom, as well as smoothly comprehensible within the philosophical ductus of the Enneads. In comparison, the gain is enormous.
For whoever wishes to submit a rational reconstruction of Plotinus's philosophy must take his philosophical premises and intentions seriously. This sounds banal. But for Plotinus's explanation of matter this implies that one is to follow his basic tenet of the first producing Principle's complete and utter Goodness, Its sole causation, and Its omnipotence down to the detail. And this means that the interpreter has to apply this tenet all the way down to the prÒodow from the One and even to the very last outpost of this procession, which is matter. To avoid paradoxes (such as Good producing evil) and inconsistencies (such as a tacit dualism of principles, one entirely active and good, one totally evil) in the interpretation of Plotinus, and to avoid, above all and even more calamitous, imputing such paradoxes and inconsistencies to Plotinus rather than to oneself, a consistent explication of matter and evil in the Enneads should run like this: the One produces whatever it produces completely and flawlessly. The generation of being stemming from it brings forth matter as the last possible offspring in the ontological procession. Matter, as the hypokeimenon of soul's activity, has what no 'emanate' or hypokeimenon had so far, i.e., passively and potentialiter (never in actu or 'as such', neither of which ever applies to matter) the disposition to wake evil in the constellation and manner described above in its exasperating interaction with soul which experiences it as completely inert and in no way apt for formation. This is why matter, in an enallagé of thoughts which turns our attention from a view of matter 'per se' to Plotinus' conception of the problem quoad nos, is called the kakÒn in the Enneads. Matter thus and in a way as awkward as its own 'meontic being' completes the perfect order and scaling of the entire cosmos, or at least it does so as long as it remains pure passive dÊnamiw not in contact with soul. Only when soul comes upon it in a certain wrong way which does not have to be wrong but can be wrong, evils come into 49 Plotinus states this in Enn. I.8 [51] .7,16ff, a passage which also deserves attention insofar as it touches on the problem of Plato's 'necessity'-formula in Theaetetus 176a. Note again how 'evil' is inserted in the 'processual philosophy' and matter, again, is what is most distant from the Good (substitute 'First' for 'actuality', 'Last' for 'potentiality' in Armstrong's translation, and the case will become clearer). The consequence (ka‹ aÏth ktl.) will be that matter (qua mere potentiality) will be necessary for the prÒodow to come to an end, and this is where evil comes in as well, since evil, though not simply the same as matter, will not come about without matter. Though Plotinus does not say here, in what manner: "One can grasp the necessity of evil in this way too. Since not only the Good exists, there must be the last end to the process of going out past it [. . .] : and this last, after which nothing else can come into being, is evil. Now it is necessary that what comes after the First should exist, and therefore that the Last should exists; and this is matter, which possesses nothing at all of the Good. And in this way too evil is necessary". Evil here is clearly the outcome of a process. Again, it is not an instance per se, but the result of a miscarried relation at the lowest seam of reality.
50 Tragische Schuld im Theatrum Mundi Plotins, and in Unde Malum, pp. 69-104 (cf. above footnote 21).
51 As a matter of fact, it will take much more than that to compel consent to this interpretation. There are some notoriously difficult passages in the Enneads, which the world: there was no need for them to come about. But, Íp¢r mÒron, it happened.
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As it is easy to see, the problem in this paper was strictly narrowed down to the question of matter and evil; for that limited scope, what I said should suffice. However, it should have become clear that a second constituent is lacking for a thorough explanation of evil and its coming about. That second constituent is, of course, soul's role in the drama of evil, and an interpretation of what it means that the soul 'sins' and 'falls' etc. I have treated this problem(s) at length elsewhere 50 and I hope to have coupled my answer(s) to the question of 'evil' matter in such a way as to render the whole a compact and consistent exegesis of Plotinus's view on evil altogether. For now, I should just like to point out that the fact that my interpretation of matter in Plotinus's normative ontology cannot stand alone but needs a complementary view on the coherence of his philosophical system, makes a strong point in favour of its accuracy, and, if I may be so bold, of its 'Plotinian spirit'.
Some possible consequences
No doubt, this interpretation of matter's 'status' and 'normative assessment' in Plotinus's ontology takes getting used to.
51 As a methodologically advisable lectio difficilior of Plotinus's own wording and as a correction
